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Abstract:	 This	 paper	 is	 mainly	 about	 Brentano’s	 commentaries	 on	 Ernst	 Mach	 in	 his	lectures	 “Contemporary	 philosophical	 questions”	 which	 he	 held	 one	 year	 before	 he	 left	Austria.	 I	 will	 first	 identify	 the	main	 sources	 of	 Brentano’s	 interests	 in	 Comte’s	 and	 J.	 S.	Mill’s	positivism	during	his	Würzburg	period.	The	second	section	provides	a	short	overview	of	Brentano’s	1893-1894	lectures	and	his	criticism	of	Comte,	Kirchhoff,	and	Mill.	The	next	sections	bear	on	Brentano’s	criticism	of	Mach’s	monism	and	Brentano’s	argument	against	the	reduction	of	the	mental	based	on	his	theory	of	intentionality.	The	last	section	is	about	Brentano’s	proposal	to	replace	the	identity	relation	in	Mach’s	theory	of	elements	by	that	of	intentional	correlation.	I	conclude	with	a	remark	on		the	history	of	philosophy	in	Austria.			In	his	article	“My	last	wishes	to	Austria”,	written	just	before	he	left	Vienna	in	1895,	Franz	Brentano	(1929c,	p.	10)	recalls	 that,	as	he	was	appointed	 in	Vienna	 in	1874,	 the	Austrian	minister	 entrusted	 him	 the	 task	 to	 implement,	 in	 Austria,	 	 “the	 seeds	 of	 a	 genuine	philosophy”	at	a	time	when	most	philosophy	chairs	in	Austria	were	occupied	by	Herbart’s	disciples.	This	project	 stands	out	clearly	 in	 several	 lectures	delivered	by	Brentano	during	his	 Vienna	 period	 (1874-1895),	 particularly	 in	 his	 inaugural	 address	 at	 the	University	 of	Vienna	 entitled	 “On	 the	 reasons	 for	discouragement	 in	 the	 field	 of	 philosophy”.	Brentano	(1929a)	 addresses	 the	prejudice	 that	 philosophy	had	become	 an	 obsolete	 discipline	with	regard	to	the	remarkable	development	of	natural	sciences,	and	his	purpose	was	to	interest	the	young	Austrians	in	a	new	program	based	on	the	principles	of	an	empirical	philosophy.	As	Oskar	Kraus	(in	Brentano,	1929,	p.	157)	rightly	pointed	out	in	his	edition	of	this	writing,	the	philosophical	program	that	Brentano	outlines	 in	his	 inaugural	address	 is	based,	 if	not	directly	on	Comte’s	positive	philosophy	as	such,	at	least	on	the	outcome	of	his	research	on	Comte’s	 and	 Mill’s	 positivism	 during	 his	 Würburg	 period.	 This	 program	 has	 been	systematically	developed	in	Brentano’s	Psychology	from	an	empirical	Standpoint	published	a	few	months	after	his	inaugural	address.		As	Brentano	makes	it	clear	at	the	very	beginning	of	this	work,	he	advocates	a	philosophy	of	experience,	which	is	akin	to	the	task	and	method	of	natural	sciences.	Brentano	continued	to	attach	much	importance	to	positivism	during	the	Vienna	period	and	later	 in	Florence	as	evidenced	by	the	notes,	which	he	dictated	during	the	winter	of	1905-1906	and	published	under	 the	 title	Über	Ernst	Machs	‘Erkenntnis	und	Irrtum’.	 Less	known	perhaps	are	Brentano’s	 lectures	“Contemporary	philosophical	questions”	which	he	held	in	Vienna	 one	 year	 before	 he	 left	 Austria	 and	 in	 which	 he	 extensively	 discusses	 Mach’s	positivism.	In	these	lectures,	Brentano	examines	four	versions	of	positivism,	that	of	Auguste	Comte,	 which	 he	 compares	 with	 Kirchhoff’s	 descriptivism,	 and	 Mach’s	 phenomenalism,	which	he	 compares	with	 John	Stuart	Mill’s	 empiricism.	Brentano	 claims	 that	 the	 last	 two	
versions	of	positivism	 represent	 a	progress	over	 the	other	 two	versions,	 namely	because	they	are	up	to	date	with	respect	to	the	development	of	natural	sciences,	and	because	they	recognize	 the	 philosophical	 value	 of	 the	 field	 of	 mental	 phenomena,	 i.e.	 descriptive	psychology.		Brentano’s	 correspondence	 with	 Husserl	 (1994)	 and	 Mach	 (Brentano,	 1988)	 in	 1895	testifies	 that,	 despite	 his	 reservations	 regarding	 the	metaphysical	 positions	 advocated	 in	these	different	versions	of	positivism,	there	remains,	however,	a	“consensus	on	the	method	of	 research,”	 namely	 with	 Brentano’s	 methodological	 phenomenalism.	 What	 Brentano	criticizes	in	Mach’s	monism,	is	the	identification	of	physical	and	mental	phenomena	and	he	argues	 against	 Mach	 that	 the	 two	 classes	 of	 phenomena	 are	 irreducible	 to	 one	 another.		Moreover,	Brentano	raises	 the	question	as	 to	whether,	with	some	modifications,	 it	would	not	be	possible	to	preserve	the	essential	of	Mach’s	theory	of	elements	and	he	proposes	to	replace	the	identity	relation	between	the	two	classes	of	phenomena	by	that	of	correlativity	(Correlativität)	 through	which	he	characterizes	namely	 the	 intentional	relation	between	a	psychical	phenomenon	and	its	object.		
1.		Brentano’s	background	and	the	sources	of	his	interests	in	positivism		In	1869,	Brentano	held	a	series	of	public	lectures	on	Comte	and	published,	in	the	Catholic	journal	 Chillianeum,	 an	 article	 entitled	 Auguste	 Comte	 and	 positive	 philosophy,	 which	Brentano	 considered	 the	 first	 of	 a	 series	 of	 seven	 articles	 that	 he	 planned	 to	 write	 on	Comte’s	philosophy	(Brentano,	1869).	Even	 if	 this	project	has	never	been	carried	out,	 the	question	arises	as	to	why	the	young	Brentano	was	so	much	interested	in	positivism	and	in	Comte’s	 philosophy	 in	 particular.	 As	 a	 first	 approximation,	 there	 are	 several	 aspects	 of	Comte’s	philosophy	 in	Brentano’s	paper	on	Comte,	which	were	already	at	 the	heart	of	his	philosophical	 preoccupations	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	 his	 professorship	 in	 Würzburg.	 First,	according	to	the	fourth	thesis	in	Brentano’s	habilitation	in	1866,	philosophy	must	adopt	the	method	 of	 natural	 sciences.	 The	 importance	 of	 this	 thesis	 in	 Brentano’s	 philosophy	 is	attested	 at	 several	 places	 in	 his	 writings	 and	 namely	 in	 his	 paper	 on	 Comte	 where	 he	emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 using	 the	 inductive	 method	 in	 philosophy.	 Secondly,	Brentano’s	criticism	of	speculative	philosophy	in	his	early	Würzburg	period	is	akin	to	that	which	Comte	directed	against	metaphysical	and	theological	explanations	in	his	three	states	law.	This	stands	out	clearly	 in	Brentano’s	habilitation	talk	 from	1866	 in	which	he	harshly	criticises	Schelling’s	speculative	philosophy	(Brentano,	1929d).	A	 third	 important	 factor	 lies	 in	 Brentano’s	 philosophy	 of	 history,	which	 is	 known	 as	 the	theory	 of	 the	 four	 phases	 in	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy	 and	 which	 is,	 in	 many	 respects,	compatible	with	Comte’s	three	states	law	(Brentano,	1998).	Brentano	claims	that	there	are	regularities	 in	the	course	of	 the	history	of	philosophy	since	the	pre-Socratics	and	one	can	observe,	within	each	of	the	three	major	philosophical	periods,	four	phases	or	moments:	the	first	stage	is	ascending	while	the	three	following	phases	mark	its	gradual	decline.	Brentano	considers	 that	 his	 time	 belongs	 to	 a	 state	 of	 decline	 as	 shown	 by	 the	 place	 assigned	 to	
German	idealism	in	his	theory.	Brentano’s	evaluation	raises	the	important	issue	as	to	what	is	likely	to	take	over	from	this	phase,	which	Brentano	describes	as	one	of	extreme	decline.	We	find	a	clear	answer	to	this	question	in	his	paper	on	Comte	where	Brentano	says	that	his	time	 is	 ready	 for	 “a	positive	 treatment	 of	 philosophy”	 (Brentano,	 1869,	 p.	 133)	Brentano	saw	in	the	positivist	treatment	of	philosophy	the	signs	of	an	ascending	stage	in	the	history	of	philosophy	after	the	decline	of	idealistic	systems.		But	the	most	important	factor	lies	in	the	importance	he	attached	to	British	empiricism	and	to	 J.	 Stuart	 Mill’s	 philosophy	 in	 particular.	 J.	 S.	 Mill’s	 book	Auguste	 Comte	 and	 positivism	drew	Brentano's	attention	to	Comte’s	philosophy	and	it	stands	out	clearly	from	Brentano’s	paper	on	Comte	that	his	own	interpretation	owes	much	to	Mill’s	work	(Mill,	1969).	This	is	confirmed	by	a	letter	from	Brentano	to	Mill	(February	1872)	in	which	he	acknowledges	his	debt	 to	 Mill’s	 scientific	 contribution	 and	 thanks	 him	 for	 having	 drawn	 his	 attention	 to	Comte’s	philosophy	and	to	have	awakened	in	him	a	new	hope	for	the	future	of	philosophy.	Brentano	complained	 to	Mill	 of	 the	deplorable	 state	of	philosophy	 in	Germany	and	of	his	intention	 to	 undertake	 a	 reform	 of	 philosophy	 based	 on	 that	 of	 natural	 sciences	 along	positivist	lines.	He	was	pleased	to	see	that	his	ideas	were,	in	many	respects,	similar	to	those	of	Mill,	 particularly	with	 regard	 to	 the	method	 and,	 as	we	 shall	 see,	 to	Mill’s	 doctrine	 of	permanent	possibilities	of	sensation1.	In	 his	 article	 on	 Comte,	 Brentano	 (1869)	 examines	 several	 aspects	 of	 Comte’s	 Cours	 de	
philosophie	positive	which	had	a	direct	 impact	on	Brentano’s	philosophical	program	in	his	
Psychology	from	1874.	The	first	aspect	pertains	to	the	nature	of	phenomena.	The	notion	of	phenomenon	 such	 as	Comte	uses	 it	 in	 his	work	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	Brentano	 in	light	 of	 its	 central	 role	 in	 Brentano’s	 Psychology	 where	mental	 and	 physical	 phenomena	constitute	the	object	of	psychology	(psychic	phenomena)	and	natural	sciences	(the	physical	phenomena)	 respectively.	 That	 is	 why	 P.	 Simons,	 and	 more	 recently	 Tim	 Crane	 (2014),	attribute	 to	Brentano	a	 form	of	methodological	phenomenalism	whose	origin	 is	 in	Comte.	Secondly,	 Brentano	 considers	 that,	 with	 some	modifications,	 Comte’s	 three	 states	 law	 is	compatible	 with	 his	 own	 theory	 of	 the	 four	 phases	 that	 I	 mentioned	 above.	 Brentano	further	 agrees	with	Comte	 that	 natural	 sciences	 are	 solely	 concerned	with	 the	discovery,	through	 the	 observation	 of	 individual	 cases,	 of	 relations	 of	 similarity	 and	 succession	between	phenomena,	which	fall	under	general	laws.	The	main	task	of	science	is	therefore	to	look	for	general	laws	that	govern	these	relations	and	to	reduce	them	to	the	lowest	possible	number.		Finally,	 Comte	 has	 had	 a	 lasting	 influence	 on	 Brentano’s	 classification	 of	 sciences.	Brentano’s	main	 reservation	 regarding	 Comte’s	 classification	 is	 clearly	 formulated	 at	 the																																																									1	Moreover,	in	the	summer	of	1872,	Brentano	made	a	trip	to	England	in	order	to	meet	J.	Stuart	Mill	and	several	British	philosophers.	Unfortunately,	this	encounter	with	J.	S.	Mill	never	took	place,	but	we	know	that	he	met	H.	Spencer	and	several	influential	British	philosophers	(Fisette,	2014a).		
very	end	of	his	paper	where	he	criticizes	Comte	for	not	admitting,	in	his	own	classification,	two	 disciplines	 which	 constitute	 the	 two	 main	 axes	 of	 Brentano’s	 philosophy,	 i.e.,	metaphysics	and	psychology.	Brentano	opposes	to	Comte’s	classification	that	proposed	by	Aristotle	 and	 he	 refers	 to	 Aristotle’s	 De	 Anima	 where	 psychology	 is	 considered	 the	philosophical	science	par	excellence.	However,	Brentano	claims	that	the	recognition	of	the	status	 of	 science	 to	 psychology	 does	 not	 compromise	 the	 value	 of	 Comte’s	 theory	 of	 the	three	 states,	 nor	 the	 principles	 of	 his	 classification.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 says	 Brentano,	 it	confirms	them.2		
	
2.	Brentano’s	lectures	“Contemporary	philosophical	questions”:	an	overview	The	main	part	of	Brentano’s	1893-1894	 lectures	 “Contemporary	philosophical	questions”	bears	on	positivism	and	monism	in	Comte,	Kirchhoff,	Mach,	and	J.	S.	Mill	(p.	29376	et	sq.).		The	manuscript	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 parts.	 	In	 the	 first	 part,	 Brentano	 compares	 Comte’s	positive	philosophy	with	Kirchhoff’s	descriptivism,	(p.	29378	f.)	while	in	the	second	part	(p.	29410	f.),	Brentano	compares	J.	S.	Mill’s	philosophy	with	Mach’s	phenomenalism.	I	will	first	very	briefly	summarizes	Brentano’s	analysis	of	the	three	first	versions	of	positivism	before	examining,	more	extensively,	Brentano’s	position	vis-a-vis	Mach’s	phenomenalism.	First	of	all,	these	four	versions	of	Positivism	have	several	points	in	common,	beginning	with	the	importance	they	attach	to	the	description	of	phenomena.	Brentano	is	in	agreement	with	this	aspect	of	descriptivism	which	 favours	 the	“how”	question	over	 the	 “why”	question	 in	the	sense	that	the	description	of	phenomena	is	prior	to,	and	a	necessary	condition	to	their	explanation.	This	trait	can	also	be	found	in	Brentano's	lectures	on	descriptive	psychology,	in	which	 he	 distinguishes,	 within	 psychology,	 genetic	 or	 physiological	 psychology	 from	descriptive	psychology	and	in	which	he	emphasizes	the	primacy	of	description	and	analysis	of	psychical	phenomena	over	the	causal	explanations	by	genetic	psychology.	Descriptivism	is	mainly	associated	in	these	lectures	with	the	school	of	Kirchhoff	 in	physics	and	with	the	task	assigned	 to	mechanics	 to	describe	 the	movements	 in	nature	 in	 the	 simplest	possible	way	(p.	29381).	The	requirement	of	simplicity	 in	description	 is	also	 found	 in	Comte,	who	assigns	to	sciences	to	 fix	the	 laws	which	govern	the	relations	between	phenomena	and	to	reduce	 them	 to	 the	 smallest	possible	number.	 In	Mach,	 it	 corresponds	 to	 the	principle	of	economy	of	thought	(Mach,	1903).	What	 Brentano	 criticizes	 in	 his	 lectures	 is	 the	 unknowable	 nature	 of	 causes	 and	 the	rejection	of	 explanations	based	on	 the	primary	 causes	of	observed	phenomena.	Brentano	admits	 that	Comte,	 for	example,	does	not	exclude	 the	existence	of	causes,	but	he	believes	that	Comte	and	Kirchhoff	are	unjustified	to	affirm	that	an	advanced	science	renounces	the	search	for	causes	(p.	29403).	Brentano	argues	that	natural	sciences	are	not	limited	to	what																																																									2	I	have	argued	elsewhere	that	all	these	elements	are	part	of	Brentano’s	program	of	a	psychology	as	a	science,	which	he	develops	during	his	Vienna	period	(Fisette,	2014a;	see	Münch,	1989).		
is	 given	 directly	 in	 experience	 and	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 cause	 can	 not	 be	wholly	 excluded	from	the	natural	sciences	as	most	positivists	believe.	Brentano	claims	that	explanations	in	scences	are	irreducible	to	descriptions	and	they	in	fact	require	causality:		Daß	 vielmehr	 1.	 die	 Annahme	 der	 Existenz	 von	 Bewegungen	 <von	 bewegter	Materie>	 zur	 Erklärung	 der	 psychischen	 Phänomene	 schon	 etwas	 anderes	 als	Beschreibung	von	Bewegungen	 ist	 und	2.	 im	besonderen	nur	unter	 zu	Hilfenahme	des	Causalbegriffes	begründet	werden	könnte	(p.	29408-29409).	Brentano	 rejects	 these	 two	 versions	 of	 positivism	 advocated	 by	 Kirchhoff	 and	 Comte	because,	according	to	him,	every	advanced	science	does	not	renounce	explanations	which	resort	to	causality	and	the	first	two	versions	of	positivism	are	therefore	lagging	behind	the	development	of	sciences.	Brentano	then	wonders	whether,	in	view	of	these	objections,	one	should	 rule	 out	 any	 form	 of	 positivism	 or	 consider	 other	 versions	 even	 if	 they	 are	 to	 be	critically	 complemented.	 He	 opted	 for	 the	 second	 option	 and	 proposed	 to	 examine	 the	versions	proposed	by	 J.	 S.	Mill	 (1865)	 and	E.	Mach	 (1914,	 1891,	 1892).	 I	 shall	 first	 say	 a	word	about	J.	S.	Mill's	permanent	possibility	of	sensation,	and	then	turn	to	the	position	of	Mach	in	the	next	sections.	Brentano	maintains	that,	for	all	four	versions	of	positivism,	the	objects	of	experience	are,	in	one	way	or	another,	reducible	to	one’s	own	mental	phenomena	and	to	percepts	in	the	case	of	sensory	perception.	For	if	phenomena	are	somehow	related	to	experience,	then	they	are	necessarily	related	to	mental	states	(sensory	perception).	In	other	words:	esse	est	percipii.	It	follows	that	“only	our	own	psychical	phenomena	deserve	the	name	of	facts	of	experience”	(p.	29411).	Through	this	doctrine,	 J.	S.	Mill	seeks	to	account	for	the	way	in	which	one	can	believe	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 spatial	 outer	world	 from	 the	 data	 of	 sensory	 experience	 (p.	29423).	According	to	Mill,	our	representation	of	the	external	world	contains,	in	addition	to	the	 sensations	 which	 are	 momentary	 and	 fleeting,	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 possibilities	 of	sensations	 which	 come	 to	 us,	 in	 part,	 from	 past	 experiences	 or	 observations	 and	 which	indicate	that	under	certain	circumstances,	one	can	experience	 it	again.	Mill	 further	claims	that	 sensations	 change	while	 these	 possibilities	 persist	 or	 are	 permanent	 (1865,	 p.	 237-238).	Brentano	argues	 that	Mill’s	philosophy	marks	an	 improvement	over	 those	of	Comte	and	Kirchhoff	not	only	because	he	takes	into	account	the	domain	of	mental	phenomena	but	also	because	he	admits	the	possibility	of	the	knowledge	of	causes	and	causal	laws.3		
3.	Mach’s	psychophysical	identity	and	his	theory	of	elements	Brentano's	 position	 towards	 positivism	 is	 not	 very	 different	 from	 that	which	 he	 adopted	during	the	Würzburg	period	with	regard	to	Comte	and	J.	S.	Mill.	As	it	is	clearly	stated	in	his																																																									3	In	his	Psychology,	Brentano	refers	to	Mill's	doctrine	in	relation	to	his	definition	of	natural	sciences	as	a	science	of	physical	phenomena,	and	proposed	a	definition	of	the	object	of	natural	sciences	along	Comtian	lines;	in	this	context,	he	compares	his	concept	of	force	to	Mill’s	permanent	possibilities	of	sensation	(2009,	p.	76).			
letter	to	Mach	that	I	mentioned	earlier,	there	is	an	“agreement	on	the	method	of	research,”	in	 that	 both	 share	 methodological	 phenomenalism.	 However,	 Brentano	 unequivocally	rejects	phenomenalism	associated	with	a	kind	of	neutral	monism,	according	 to	which	 the	world	 is	 made	 of	 neither	 matter	 nor	 spirit,	 but	 of	 a	 neutral	 stuff,	 which	 can	 be	 treated	according	 to	 the	 context,	 interests	 and	 the	 direction	 of	 research	 as	 mental	 or	 material.	Neutral	monism	also	refers	to	a	metaphysical	position	which	affirms	that	the	uniqueness	of	reality	 and	 its	 neutrality	 with	 respect	 to	 whether	 it	 is	 physical	 or	 psychical.	 Mach	 thus	defends	 an	 anti-metaphysical	 position	 insofar	 as	 he	 believes	 that	 everything	 which	 goes	beyond	what	is	immediately	given	is	metaphysical	and	any	science	which	does	not	conform	to	pure	description	is	merely	dealing	with	Scheinprobleme.	As	Brentano	explains:	Mach	 erklärt	 darum	 die	 räumliche	 Außenwelt	 und	 alles	 was	 man	 von	Bewegungsvorgängen	 in	 ihr	 anzunehmen	 pflegt	 verwerfen	 zu	 müssen,	 weil	 diese	Annahmen	 innerlich	 absurd	 seien.	 Die	 Forscher,	meint	 er,	 schienen	 allerdings	 in	 |	der	 Verfolgung	 wissenschaftlicher	 Probleme	 in	 rechtmäßiger	 Weise	 zu	 ihnen	 zu	gelangen.	Aber	dennoch	sei	es	unvernünftig	daran	zu	glauben	(p.	29429-29430).	Mach's	position	rests	on	his	doctrine	of	elements	and	involves	a	rejection	of	metaphysical	assertions	on	the	realities	of	the	external	world,	and	Mach's	monism	has	the	consequence	of	reducing	 the	 world	 and	 all	 that	 it	 contains	 to	 functional	 relations	 and	 combinations	between	sensations.	Brentano	 advocates	 instead	 a	 form	of	 critical	 realism	 according	 to	which	 the	 only	 access	one	has	to	the	external	world	is	by	means	of	phenomena	through	which	they	are	given	to	us;	 but	 these	 objects	 exist	 independently	 of	 being	 perceived.	 And	 this	 form	 of	 critical	realism	is	compatible	with	methodological	phenomenalism.	Moreover,	Brentano	also	denies	Mach’s	thesis	according	to	which	the	task	of	science	is	merely	to	describe	and	not	to	explain	phenomena	and	argues,	as	he	did	against	Kirchhoff	and	Comte,	that	“it	is	unfair	to	claim	that	advanced	sciences	renounces	the	search	for	causes”	(p.	29403).		Brentano	 focuses	 on	 two	 important	 points	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 Mach:	 the	 non-reality	 of	 a	spatial	world	and	the	identity	of	the	two	classes	of	phenomena.	Brentano	claims	that	Mach’s	phenomenalism	and	his	proof	of	the	absurdity	of	a	spatial	external	world	are	grounded	on	the	identity	of	the	mental	and	the	physical	 in	sensations,	which	Mach	clearly	stated	at	the	very	beginning	of	The	Analysis	of	sensations:	“I	see	no	opposition	of	physical	and	psychical,	but	simple	 identity	as	regards	these	elements.	 In	 the	sensory	sphere	of	my	consciousness	everything	 is	 at	 once	 physical	 and	 psychical”	 (Mach,	 1914,	 p.	 44;	 see	 p.	 310).	 And	 this	identity	 is	 based,	 in	 turn,	 on	 Mach’s	 theory	 of	 elements	 and	 functional	 dependencies	 of	sensory	elements	on	one	another.		Mach’s	 theory	 of	 elements	 is	 a	 system	 of	 general	 principles	 on	 the	 immediate	 data	 of	experience.	The	basic	idea	is	to	consider	the	psychological	or	physical	objects	as	a	complex	of	 elements,	which	 are	bound	 together	by	 functional	 relations	of	dependence	of	different	kinds.	The	essential	difference	between	these	classes	of	relations,	and	namely,	between	the	relation	to	a	physical	object	and	that	to	a	mental	state,	for	example,	depends	on	whether	the	
elements	overlap	the	sensory	surfaces	or	the	periphery	of	our	senses.		To	be	more	precise,	the	boundary	 that	delineates	what	belongs	 to	 the	physical	 and	 to	 the	mental	depends	on	what	he	calls	“a	spatial	delimitation	U	of	our	own	body”	or	the	flesh.	For,	since	the	sensory	world	 belongs	 simultaneously	 to	 the	 physical	 and	 to	 the	 psychical	 world,	 the	 difference	between	physics	and	the	physiology	of	senses,	 for	 instance,	depends	primarily	on	the	fact	that	the	latter	only	takes	into	account	our	own	body	(i.e.	our	nervous	system).	The	function	
U	makes	 it	possible	both	 to	present	 the	 functional	 relations	between	 the	elements	and	 to	distinguish	the	physical	from	the	psychological	in	a	non-substantialist	way.	The	three	more	important	classes	of	relation	structuring	the	elements	are	the	following:	1a.	Relations	of	physical	dependence:	relations	between	items	A,	B,	C,	etc.	outside	of	
U;	1b.	Neurophysiological	relations	of	dependence:	relations	between	the	elements	K,	L,	M,	etc.	inside	of	U;	2.	Psychophysiological	relations:	relations	between	elements	inside	and	outside	of	U,	i.e.,	relations	between	1a	and	1b;	3.	Relations	of	psychological	dependence:	 relation	between	elements	a,	b,	 c,	 etc.	 to	which	correspond	mental	states	or	mental	phenomena	such	as	presentation,	feeling,	judgment,	etc.	Each	variable	takes	its	value	only	when	it	takes	place	in	a	physical	or	psychophysiological	relation.	 For	 instance,	 the	 elements	 A,	 B,	 C	 refer	 to	 physical	 objects,	 physical	 properties,	psychological	objects,	or	sensations	only	insofar	as	they	take	place	in	a	relation	of	physical	dependence	 (i.e.	 relations	 1a	 and	 1b),	 a	 psychophysiological	 dependence	 (relation	 2),	 or	psychological	dependence	(relation	3).	To	quote	Mach	again:	A	color	is	a	physical	object	as	soon	as	we	consider	its	dependence,	for	instance,	upon	its	 luminous	 source,	 upon	 other	 colors,	 upon	 temperatures,	 upon	 spaces,	 and	 so	forth.	When	we	consider,	however,	its	dependence	upon	the	retina	(the	elements	K,	L,	M,	 etc.),	 it	 is	 a	 psychological	 object,	 a	 sensation.	Not	 the	 subject	matter,	 but	 the	direction	of	our	investigation,	is	different	in	the	two	domains	(1914,	p.	17-18).		This	 holds	a	 fortiori	 for	 the	 subject,	which	Mach	 understands	 as	 a	 complex	 of	 functional	relations	of	a	certain	kind.	It	follows	that	the	subject	matter	of	all	sciences	is	the	same,	i.e.	the	elements	and	functional	relations	between	them,	whereas	their	differences	rest	on	one’s	stance	toward	them	and	in	the	interests	and	orientation	of	the	research.			
4.	Argument	de	Brentano	contre	la	thèse	de	l’identité:	intentionnalité	As	I	said,	Mach’s	doctrine	of	elements	amounts	to	identifying	what	Brentano	considers	two	irreducible	classes	of	phenomena.	It	therefore	does	not	account	satisfactorily	for	the	duality	in	the	percept	or	in	one’s	state	of	mind	such	as	an	emotion	between	the	feeling	and	what	is	felt,	 or	 between	 perceiving	 and	what	 is	 perceived.	 According	 to	 Brentano,	 to	 this	 duality	correspond	two	classes	of	phenomena,	which	are	bearers	of	heterogeneous	and	irreducible	proprieties,	and	this	identification	is	therefore	absurd	(Brentano,	1988,	p.	28;	67f.).	For	this	
identification	would	 amount	 to	 identifying	 „das	 Sehen	 der	 Farbe	 und	 die	 Farbe	 und	 das	Hören	 des	 Schalls	 und	 der	 Schall	 u.s.w.	 identisch	 seien.	 Wie	 keine	 Empfindung	 ohne	immanentes	räumliches	Objekt,	so	könne	also	auch	kein	Räumliches	anders	denn	als	Objekt	unseres	Bewußtseins	bestehen“	(p.	29433).	In	 his	 Psychology,	 Brentano	 had	 already	 considered	 a	 similar	 hypothesis	 which	 he	attributed	 to	 Alexander	 Bain	 and	 J.	 Stuart	 Mill	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	primary	and	secondary	objects	and	it	consists	merely	in	identifying	primary	and	secondary	objects.	 Brentano’s	 main	 argument	 against	 this	 identification	 rests	 on	 the	 view	 that	 the	essential	properties	of	the	class	of	mental	phenomena	are	not	attributable	to	the	other	class	and	vice	versa	(2009,	p.	94-95).	There	is	thus	irreducibility	of	the	object	seen	to	the	vision	of	the	object,	and	as	Brentano	explains	in	Sinnespsychology,	when	one	says	that	the	primary	and	secondary	objects	appear	simultaneously	to	consciousness,	“appearing	simultaneously	does	not	mean	appearing	as	the	same”	(1907,	p.	96).		Brentano’s	 argument	 against	 this	 identification	 is	 systematically	 developed	 in	 the	 first	chapter	 of	 the	 second	 book	 of	 his	Psychology	 where	 he	 discusses	 several	 criteria	 for	 the	delineation	of	the	mental	from	the	physical.	 	Concretely,	in	the	case	of	the	color	green,	the	vision	of	green	is	a	psychical	phenomenon,	which	is	about	the	color	green,	while	the	seen	color,	 which	 Brentano	 conceived	 of	 in	 1874	 as	 an	 immanent	 object	 of	 presentations,	belongs	 to	 the	 class	 of	 physical	 phenomena	 (p.	 29439).	 The	 following	 quote	 from	Brentano’s	lectures	summarizes	Brentano’s	position	on	that	issue:	Sensing	 (das	Empfinden)	 always	 has	 the	 general	 characteristic	 feature	 of	 a	mental	phenomenon,	 which	 is	 characterized	 as	 an	 intentional	 relation	 to	 an	 immanent	object.	 It	 can	 be	 found	 similarly	 in	 memorising,	 desiring,	 enjoying,	 recognizing,	negating,	 etc.	 However,	 what	 is	 felt	 [in	 sensing]	 has	 the	 general	 character	 of	 a	physical	phenomenon,	which	consists	in	the	fact	that	the	phenomenon	is	localized	(p.	29441).	Brentano	 concludes	 that	 Mach’s	 proof	 of	 the	 “absurdity	 of	 the	 assumption	 of	 a	 spatial	outside	world	on	the	basis	of	the	identity	of	the	mental	and	the	physical	in	sensations	is	a	complete	failure”	(29443).		
5.	Identity	versus	correlation		Now,	 if	 one	 accepts	 with	 Brentano	 the	 irreducible	 character	 of	 these	 two	 classes	 of	phenomena,	 the	 question	 arises	 as	 to	 whether,	 with	 some	 modifications,	 it	 might	 be	possible	 to	 preserve	 the	 core	 of	 Mach’s	 conception	 (p.	 29444).	 Brentano	 responds	positively,	 provided	 that	 one	 replaces	 the	 identity	 relation	 between	 the	 two	 classes	 of	phenomena	by	that	of	correlativity	(Correlativität),	which	Brentano	(1982)	has	introduced	in	his	lectures	on	descriptive	psychology	held	in	Vienna	in	the	late	1880s.	In	these	lectures,	Brentano	advocates	a	relational	theory	of	 intentionality,	which	relates	mental	states	to	 its	objects:	“As	in	every	relation,	two	correlates	can	be	found	here.	The	one	correlate	is	the	act	of	 consciousness,	 the	 other	 is	 that	 <thing>	which	 it	 is	 directed	 upon.	 Seeing	 and	what	 is	
seen,	presenting	and	what	is	presented,	[...]	etc.”	(1995,	p.	23-24).	Brentano	maintains	that	what	is	specific	to	an	intentional	relation	is	that	it	includes	a	pair	of	correlates	of	which	only	one	is	real	whereas	the	intentional	correlate	or	the	immanent	object	is	not	real	(1995,	p.	23	f.).	To	be	more	precise,	the	term	correlation	refers	in	this	lecture	to	the	bilateral	relation	of	dependence	 between	 pairs	 like	 cause	 and	 effect,	 larger	 and	 smaller,	 etc.	 Brentano's	proposal	 mainly	 pertains	 to	 this	 class	 of	 correlates	 which	 he	 calls	 intentional	 correlates	(intentionales	Korrelat)	and	which	are	involved	in	the	relation	between	these	two	classes	of	phenomena.	Examples	of	intentional	correlates	include	the	pairs	presenting	and	presented,	perceiving	 and	 perceived,	 sensing	 and	 sensed,	 judging	 and	 judged,	 loving	 and	 loved,	 etc.		Brentano	maintains	that	what	is	specific	to	this	class	of	intentional	relations	lies	in	the	fact	that	it	includes	a	pair	of	correlates,	of	which	“only	one	is	real,	while	the	other	is	not.”		In	 short,	 Brentano	 considers	 in	 his	 lectures	 on	 positivism	 that	 this	 idea	 of	 correlation,	broadly	understood,	is	something	similar	but	more	appropriate	to	what	Mach	was	looking	for	with	his	doctrine	of	elements.		The	 relation	 is	 that	 between	 subject	 and	 object.	 And	 this	 certainly	 has	 to	 do	with	what	others	 like	Mach	(and	Lotze,	 for	example)	explained	by	saying	 that	 it	 is	clear	from	the	outset	that	there	can	be	no	color	without	an	act	of	seeing	(Sehen).	But	they	finally	say	nothing	about	space,	magnitude,	gestalt	and	movement.	However,	 let	us	consider	that	we	also	have	a	presentation	of	these	items	as	we	have	a	presentation	of	colors	 and	 sounds	 (...)	 through	 sensation;	 then	 it	 seems	 that,	 to	 be	 consistent,	 one	must	also	maintain,	 in	 the	same	way,	 that	magnitudes,	gestalt,	movement,	 in	short,	all	 that	 is	 spatial,	 would	 never	 be	 able	 to	 exist	 (bestehen)	 if	 not	 as	 correlates	 of	sensations	 and	 to	 entertain	 a	 subject-object	 relation	with	 the	 latter.	 The	 opposite	would	 be	 absurd.	 And	 we	 will	 have	 something	 essentially	 similar	 to	 what	 Mach	wanted		[with	his	doctrine	of	elements]	(p.	29444-29445).	
	
6.	Final	remarks	Brentano	 referred	 to	 his	 lectures	 on	 positivism	 in	 a	 letter	 to	Mach	 from	May	 1895.	 This	letter	 has	 a	 particular	 significance	 because	 it	 is	 addressed	 to	 the	 one	who	was	 called	 to	succeed	him	in	Vienna	as	Chair	of	history	and	theory	of	the	inductive	sciences,	 left	vacant	since	 Brentano’s	 resignation	 in	 1880.	 Brentano	 informed	 Mach	 about	 his	 lecture	 on	positivism:		You	 probably	 do	 not	 know	 that,	 by	 happenstance,	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 lecture	 I	taught	 last	 winter	 on	 the	 theme	 of	 positivism	 and	 monism,	 I	 addressed	 your	positions	 on	 that	 theme	 in	 detail.	 I	 considered	 Comte	 and	 Kirchhoff	 as	 the	representatives	of	a	 thoughtless	positivism,	whereas	 I	considered	J.	Stuart	Mill	and	Mach	as	the	representatives	of	an	evolved	positivism.	However,	I	attempted	to	show	why	one	form	or	another	of	positivism	proves	to	be	untenable.	[…]	I	am	and	always	have	 been	 convinced	 that	 consensus	 on	mere	 wording—even	 if	 its	 significance	 is	great—is	of	less	import	than	consensus	on	research	methods”	(1988,	p.	204).		
This	 excerpt	 shows	 that	 despite	 his	 reservations	 with	 respect	 to	 positivism,	 his	 views	regarding	research	methods,	 i.e.	methodological	phenomenalism,	remained	similar	to	that	he	adopted	upon	has	arrival	in	Vienna.		There	 are	 also	 reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 Brentano’s	 students	 in	 Vienna	 shared	 his	 opinion	about	 Mach.	 Indeed,	 in	 September	 1894,	 Mach	 was	 invited	 to	 the	 congress	 of	 the	Association	of	German	physicists	and	naturalists	held	in	Vienna	and	he	gave	a	talk	entitled	“The	principle	of	comparison	in	Physics”.	Alois	Höfler,	a	student	of	Brentano	and	Meinong,	invited	Mach	to	discuss	his	talk	at	a	meeting	of	the	Philosophical	Society	of	the	University	of	Vienna.		This	discussion	aroused	so	much	interest	that	two	further	sessions	were	organized	by	Josef	C.	Kreibig,	another	student	of	Brentano.4	These	discussions	have	convinced	several	members	 of	 the	 Philosophical	 Society	 of	 the	 interest	 of	 Mach’s	 candidature	 to	 occupy	Brentano’s	chair.	Mach	began	his	teaching	in	Vienna	in	1895	and	we	know	the	influence	he	had	on	 the	 course	of	 the	history	of	 philosophy	 in	Austria	 (Stadler,	 1997).	But	Brentano's	contribution	to	this	chapter	is	not	to	be	overlooked.	Indeed,	 Brentano’s	 program	 that	 I	 have	 mentioned	 earlier	 constitutes	 the	 philosophical	program,	which	Brentano,	 despite	 his	 precarious	 academic	 situation	 in	Vienna,	 sought	 to	establish	 in	 Austria.	 This	 program	 represents	 the	 starting	 point	 and	 the	 basis	 of	 the	philosophy	of	his	students	in	Vienna,	although	Meinong,	Ehrenfels,	Twardowski,	Hillebrand,	and	 Husserl,	 for	 example,	 have	 departed	 significantly	 from	 Brentano’s	 original	 program.	However,	 this	 program	 constitutes	 one	 of	 the	 main	 axis	 in	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy	 in	Austria	 and	 it	 also	 represents	 an	 important	 reference	 for	 the	 Austrian	 members	 of	 the	Vienna	Circle.	 In	any	case,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	when	Neurath	 (1935)	 claims,	 in	his	 remarkable	book	on	the	development	of	the	Vienna	Circle,	that	the	latter	is	nothing	but	a	radicalization	of	the	empiricists	trends	in	Vienna,	he	not	only	had	Mach	and	his	followers	in	mind,	but	also	Brentano	and	his	successors	in	Austria.		
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